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Abstract
Purpose –This study investigates an under-researched yet fundamental question of how a developed country
multinational enterprises (DMNE) perceives and manages political risks when undertaking infrastructure
projects in the emerging markets (EMs).
Design/methodology/approach – The authors use an abduction-based qualitative research approach to
analyze six international project operations of a multinational enterprise originating from Finland in five EMs.
Findings – The findings suggest that the overall nature of political risks in EMs is not the same, except few
political risk factors that are visible in most EMs. Consequently, the applied risk management mechanisms
vary between EMs, except with few common mechanisms. The authors develop an integrative analytical
framework of political risk management based on the findings.
Originality/value – This paper is one of the first studies to identify political risk factors for western MNEs
while undertaking international project operations and link them to reduction mechanisms used by them. The
authors go beyond the notion of risk being conceptualized at a general level and evaluate 20 specific political
risk factors referred to in extant literature. The authors further link these political risk factors with both social
exchange and transaction cost theories conceptually as well as empirically. Finally, the authors develop a
relatively comprehensive analytical framework of political risk management based on the case projects’
findings that combine several strands of literature, including the social exchange theory, transaction cost
theory, international market entry, project management and finance literature streams.
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Emerging markets (EMs) are major drivers of global economic growth (Gilpin, 2018). Market
liberalization, along with a higher economic growth rate, growing middle-income class and
cheap and skilled labor in EMs, has brought immense opportunities for developed country
multinational enterprises (DMNEs). The increasing need for improved infrastructure
predetermines economic growth in EMs (e.g. Cavusgil et al., 2013). According to McKinsey
and Company (2017), an investment of US$3.7tn (i.e. 4.1% of the world gross domestic
product (GDP)) is required in economic infrastructure annually until 2035, and 63% of this
investment is needed in EMs. Further, Oxford Economics (2017) reports that two-thirds of
infrastructure investment in EMs will be required for logistics (road, rails, etc.) and power
sector developments. These expanding investments in the infrastructure development in
EMs, especially in logistics and power sectors, are attracting DMNEs to take infrastructure
projects in EMs (Kardes et al., 2013).
As recently highlighted by Donthu et al. (2021) in their bibliometric review of International
Marketing Review (IMR), global business environment and the EMs in particular have
emerged among the evolving thematic and intellectual structures that are driving IMR’s
academic influence and impact. Moreover, firms facing the EM turbulence have to develop
network-based capabilities to maintain the competitive advantages (Ngasri and Freeman,
2018) and nurture the strategic agility (Nyamrunda and Freeman, 2021). In addition,
investigation of the foreignmarket entrymodes is one of the integral parts of the international
marketing domain (Oliveira et al., 2018; Samiee and Chirapanda, 2019; Vissak et al., 2020;
Watson IV et al., 2018).
While EMs represent many opportunities; there are risks to consider. DMNE operations
in EMs might be disrupted by corruption, political risks, economic crises, logistics issues
or bureaucracy, to mention a few (Henisz and Zelner, 2010). Risks related to host countries’
political environment are a major concern of DMNEs in their entry mode choices (e.g.
Kraus et al., 2015). The political risks and constraints that DMNEs face in EMs are
different from those in mature markets (Hiatt and Sine, 2014). Moreover, the
unpredictability and complexity of those political risks vary among EMs. Furthermore,
EMs are replete with institutional voids, meaning that they lack institutes that can help
DMNEs identifying these risks and facilitating market transactions (Khanna and Palepu,
2010). Without the benefit of specialized intermediaries in EMs that analyze market
information and facilitate transactions, risk management for DMNEs becomes even more
difficult (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Although the existing literature offers several
frameworks on risks and their management mechanisms, these frameworks remain
largely conceptual in their original form (e.g. Buckley, 2000; Miller, 1992; Simangunsong
et al., 2012). Furthermore, frameworks from developed market settings are not necessarily
relevant for EMs contexts that are characterized by a higher complexity (Gao et al., 2017;
Marquis and Raynard, 2015). In this view, there are clear opportunities in expanding our
understanding of DMNEs perception and risk management mechanisms in EMs. This
study builds on this opportunity.
Despite political risks and risks associated with international market entry modes,
DMNEs bring projects into EMs as a source of additional profit generation (Lessard, 1996;
Jiang et al., 2019). International project operations (IPOs) are an important market entry mode
that is commonly utilized in heavy industries (Owusu et al., 2007; Welch et al., 2018). DMNE’s
ability to properly execute IPOs has valuable implications for its operation that can be
revealed in financial gains, growth potential, market expansion and good reputation (Low
et al., 2013). Nevertheless, large investments, high level of responsibility and tight deadlines
that are associated with IPOs, make the influence of the host country’s political risk onMNEs
even more intense (e.g. Chang et al., 2018; Owusu et al., 2007; Steffen and Papakonstantinou,
2015). In particular, DMNEs that enter an EM through IPOs are likely to face such political
IMR
risks as currency transfer restrictions, breach of contract, expropriation, regulatory and
bureaucratic risks, and non-governmental action risks (Sachs, 2006).
Subsequently, DMNEs deploy additional mechanisms to safeguard their project business
operations from political risk factors in EMs (Steffen and Papakonstantinou, 2015). Although
identifying political risks before undertaking infrastructure projects is integral to managing
those risks and existing international market entry research has offered certain insights on
the nature of political risk in various host countries (e.g. Deng et al., 2018; Han et al., 2018;
Huemer, 2004; Khattab et al., 2007), empirical work specifically dealing with the political risk
management in IPOs is very limited (Chang et al., 2018; Mullner, 2016). In a recent study on
IPOs, Dandage et al. (2018) ranked the risk factors and identified that political risk is the
biggest risk in IPOs. However, they acknowledged the limited guidance on managing such
risks. Similarly, Kardes et al. (2013), as well as Mullner (2016), also call for more research on
political riskmanagement in IPOs. Thus, we aim to fill this gap in extant international market
entry literature by explicitly examining the question as to how a DMNE perceives and
manages political risks when undertaking infrastructure projects in EMs.
To enhance our understanding of DMNE’s political risk management while executing
IPOs in EMs, this study integrates relevant insights from the social exchange theory (SET),
transaction cost theory (TCT), international marketing, market entry mode and project
management (PM) literature streams. Existing literature offers several perspectives with
regard to political risk management. First, several studies (Cavusgil et al., 2013; Luo, 2001,
2004) built on the SET suggest the alignment ofMNE’s objectives with the host government’s
social and economic objectives, and developing trust-based informal networks with local
business and people of the host government to reduce political risk. Another strand of
research (Forlani et al., 2008; Lopez-Duarte and Vidal-Suarez, 2010; Mullner, 2016; Puck et al.,
2009), built on the TCT, suggests the formation of equity joint ventures (EJVs), contractual
joint ventures (CJVs) or an arm’s length classical contract with the host country firms to
reduce political risk. In contrast to the market entry literature, finance literature (Lessard,
1996; Voelker et al., 2008) suggests for buying political risk insurance (PRI), and PM literature
(Turner, 2001) suggests for the choice of appropriate payment method (i.e. the choice between
fixed cost, cost plus fixed fee and target price) in IPOs for reducing political risks. Given the
intricate nature of political risks in EMs, we believe that various strands of prior literature
should be integrated to better understand the management of political risks in IPOs.
Research on international market entry decisions has focused on the relationship between
institutes and DMNE outcomes, emphasizing that DMNE operation depends on and varies
across different institutional environments (Ahuja and Yayavaram, 2011; Douglas and Craig,
2011; Hiatt and Sine, 2014). However, a certain group of scholars argue that institutions are
more than just an environment because they directly influence DMNEs’ choice of actions
(Ingram and Silverman, 2002). Hence, DMNEs can achieve a competitive advantage through
entry modes that overcome and capitalize on the EMs’ institutional environments (Henisz,
2000). Although, existing literature has established a shared understanding of the entrymode
choices such as acquisitions, greenfield investments, joint ventures and franchising, and their
associated dynamics (e.g. Chiao et al., 2010; Erramilli and Rao, 1993), the research focus on
IPOs as an entry mode choice is rather scarce. Notwithstanding the compelling research on
recognized entry modes, understanding unique and nuanced aspects of less researched entry
mode choices will expand our knowledge about underlying processes of DMNEs’ decision-
making and their international operations (Hennart and Slangen, 2015). To understand the
underlying mechanisms that allow DMNEs to enter an EM through IPOs and to facilitate
their long-term survival, this study explores the process through which DMNE managers
perceive and address different kinds of political risks in EMs.
We adopt an abduction-based qualitative case study research approach to explore the
perceived political risks and their management by a European MNE having infrastructure
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development IPOs in five EMs of Bangladesh, Indonesia, Brazil, Jordan and Pakistan. While
much has been reported about the political obstacles faced by EMMNEs undertaking IPOs in
developing countries (Chang et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2019; Zhang andWei, 2012), political risk
perception and its management by DMNEs undertaking infrastructure projects in EMs is
rarely investigated.
This study makes several contributions to the literature on political risk in international
entry mode literature. First, the study identifies 20 political risk factors that DMNEs in focus
evaluate while planning to enter an EM. Furthermore, the study found that political risks in
five EMs are perceived differently by the managers from one DMNE.Managers who work on
the same project and operate in EMs together still perceive political risks differently.
Acknowledgment of different managerial perceptions is important to consider while deciding
to enter EMs because these markets are characterized by higher complexity than developed
markets, and they lack intermediary institute that could identify risks for the managers in
DMNEs (Gao et al., 2017).
Second, by focusing on IPOs as a specific market entry mode, we found that political risks
are subject to constraints from several mechanisms, where some mechanisms are used in all
EMs to mitigate political risks, and some are used only in a few EMs to mitigate the political
risks. Specifically, this study reveals that managers use both control and flexibility
mechanisms to manage political risks in EMs. Two flexibility mechanisms from the SET,
namely, “aligning objectives with host government” and “developing trust-based informal
networks with local business and people of host government,” and one control mechanism
from finance literature, namely, “obtaining payment guarantee from local or global financial
and commercial institutes,” and two control mechanisms from the PM literature, namely,
“fixed-term payment method” and “progressive payments,” are commonly used by a DMNE
to mitigate political risks in EMs. Especially, the two mechanisms of “obtaining payment
guarantee from local or global financial and commercial institutes” and “progressive
payments” are new findings that prior studies have not addressed. Detailed illustration of
political risk management mechanisms is an important finding because existing literature
emphasizes the dominance of the control mechanisms to minimize political risks. Emerging
findings, however, challenge the effectiveness of a control mechanism in risk management
and question whether the control can actually be sustained (Streatfield, 2001). Hence, this
paper empirically illustrates that managers in DMNEs rely on both control and flexibility to
manage political risks in EMs.
Third, we develop an overarching, comprehensive and holistic analytical framework on
political risk management based on the empirical findings of the case projects that combine
several strands of literature; SET and TCT from international market entry, PM literature
and finance literature (Figure 4). Considering that existing frameworks on risks have been
largely conceptual and designed primarily for the developed markets, this framework
contributes to the literature by extending our understanding of political risks and
mechanisms to manage these risks in EMs. This upgraded analytical framework also sets
a ground for future empirical research.
Lastly, we find that managers in DMNEs identify political risks and decide on the
mechanisms to reduce them during the second stage of the project life cycle (Figure 3). We
assume that such a nuance adds to our understanding of how managers in DMNE made
decisions related to the capitalization of the environment in which they operate.
2. Theoretical standpoint
2.1 Political risk
Based on Knight’s (1921) seminal conceptualization, risk refers to a set of possible outcomes,
and the likelihood of each occurring can be calculated, while uncertainty refers to outcomes
IMR
where the likelihood of each taking place is unknown. Therefore, unlike uncertainty, which is
unmeasurable, random and unpredictable, the risk is, to some degree, measurable (Mullner,
2016). Yet, this approach has been challenged due to its failure to capture decision-makers’
role (Hsieh et al., 2010). From the decision-makers’ point of view, the risk is often perceived as
associated with hazards, disappointing or negative outcomes (Deligonul, 2020; Miller and
Leiblein, 1996), which significantly impacts the organization’s value and its ability to achieve
targets. Therefore, risk is defined here as the managerial perception of potential instabilities
and vulnerabilities faced by MNEs that impose limitations, restrictions or even losses in
international markets (Ahmed et al., 2002).
In the international market entry context, Meschi (2005) highlights that risk involves
political and economic risks. Although the importance of economic risk in MNE’s
international operations is recognized in prior literature (e.g. Ahmed et al., 2002; Deligonul,
2020; Puck et al., 2009), the main interest of the current study lies in political risk. Broadly
speaking, political risks emanate from the possibility of adverse effects on MNE’s business
due to the host country’s potential events. Khattab et al. (2007) noted that prior literature
concerned with political risk conceptualization is divided into two groups. One group of
researchers define political risk as risk arising frompolitical actions of the government, which
include taxation restrictions, currency inconvertibility, contract repudiation, import and/or
export restrictions, ownership and/or personnel restrictions, expropriation and/or
confiscation (e.g. Butler and Joaquin, 1998; Deligonul, 2020). On the contrary, other groups
of researchers define political risks as risks arising from governmental and societal actions,
and social actions include demonstrations, riots and insurrection, revolutions, coup d’etat,
civil wars and terrorism (Stosberg, 2005).
Considering that EMs have an under-developed social–political environment that can
harm MNEs’ operations (Casson and Lopes, 2013), managerial perception of political risk
would depend on various political and societal events in the host country. Subsequently,
political risk in EMs stems from potential political and social events that may cause adverse
effects on an MNE’s business in EMs. Factors such as political violence, regime changes,
coups, revolutions, breaches of contract, terrorist attacks, wars and discriminatory actions of
the host government (e.g. expropriation, unfair compensation, foreign exchange restrictions,
unlawful interference, capital restrictions, corruption and labor restrictions) are among the
types of political risk possibilities, especially in IPOs (Chang et al., 2018). Prior research
suggests that political risk causes extra expenditures or unexpected adjustments to the
project plan, direct financial losses, less overall satisfaction and hence negatively affects the
continuity of an MNE’s IPOs in the target country (Chang et al., 2018; Zhang and Wei, 2012).
Therefore, political risk in IPOs should be handled effectively tomaterialize the benefits of the
project (Chang et al., 2018).
2.2 International project operations and political risk identification
Historically, a project is a one-time “temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique
product or service” (PMI, 2000, p. 4). However, project-based business operations have been
on the rise since the origination of modern PM in the 1960s (Turner, 2009). IPOs cover “a
broad mix of activities involved in the design and construction of different plants and
facilities: such as housing, office buildings, factories, industrial plants, mining development,
defense establishments, and social infrastructure facilities (power utilities, transport, etc.)”
(Luostarinen and Welch, 1990, p. 126). Kardes et al. (2013) report that the lack of appropriate
infrastructure in EMs has increased the demand for large-scale projects, especially during the
past two decades. Consequently, many DMNEs, which originally started operations as
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of world-renowned products, have also
undertaken IPOs as their growth strategy (Owusu et al., 2007; Kowalkowski et al., 2015).
Among such DMNEs, Siemens, ABB, Mitsubishi, Areva, Caterpillar and General Electrical
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are a few prominent examples. These OEMs have undertaken highly complex mega projects
(e.g. Kardes et al., 2013) and made a considerable contribution to the world’s infrastructure
development. This study focuses on one such MNE, which originally started as OEM, but
later also started undertaking IPOs in the energy sector.
Prior research suggests that instead of viewing IPOs as a single step, it is useful to view
them as a process (Welch et al., 2018). Cova and Holstius (1993) present six stages of the
project process: search, preparation, bidding, negotiation, implementation and transition.
Though the scholars mention that there may be variations on how the process proceeds in an
individual project case, we have attempted in Table 1 to provide an overview of the stages of
the project process found from the secondary sources of our case IPOs. The project process is
a cycle of four stages of market development and opportunity search, project preparation and
development, bidding and negotiation, and implementation. Key activities performed during
each stage are also elaborated in Table 1.
The seminal work of Liesch et al. (2011) suggests that decision-makers initially face
uncertainty only. As decision-makers actively gain more information, they convert some
uncertainties to risk, allowing them tomake decisions and take actions. This evolving view is
a key step that can help to bridge the existing research on risk and uncertainty in IPOs
(Mullner, 2016). Therefore, the availability of information reduces uncertainty from the
decision-maker’s point of view and converts it into a risk. Project literature widely
acknowledges that uncertainty is highest at the initial stage of the project and diminishes and
converts into risk as the project progresses due to information accumulation (Samset and
Volden, 2016).
2.3 Mechanisms of political risk management
Risk management is a structured process to minimize or mitigate the likelihood of risks and
their negative effects (Deligonul, 2020; Mabrouki et al., 2014). International Organization for
Standardization (ISO, 2018) has identified four steps to manage business risk: identifying the
potential risks, analyzing and evaluating them, choosing and implementing actions to reduce
them, and monitoring the risks. Although process identifies the steps to manage and monitor
the business risks, it does not specify mechanisms for managing business risks, including the
political risks. Therefore, we carried out extensive literature review on the political risk
management and found no precise theoretical model for managing political risk in IPOs.
Phases Segment Main activities
Stage 1 Market development and
opportunity search
Scanning the targeted markets and identifying project
opportunities, creating market demand on the basis of products
and services the MNE offers, evaluating the resource need for
doing profitable business in a particular market
Stage 2 Project preparation and
development
Developing opportunities through influencing and conjunction
with key players in the market, getting information and
participating in preparing tender specifications
Stage 3 Bidding and negotiation Setting up a proposal and agreeing on the business terms in the
form of formal contracts, assembling specifications for preparing
tender-specific solutions to be delivered
Stage 4 Implementation Execution, supervision, delivery and testing of the delivered
solution; evaluation of delivery process and stakeholder
relationships for future project business as the success of one








However, this review led us to identify three streams of literature, which can be employed to
explain the mechanisms for managing political risk in IPOs: international market entry,
finance and PM literatures.
In the international market entry literature, scholars have used the SET and TCT to
manage the political risks. The SET is a sociological theory initially developed to analyze
people’s social behavior in terms of the exchange of resources (Blau, 1964). Although the
origins of the SET are at the individual level, the theory has been extended to inter-firm level
(e.g. Muthusamy et al., 2007; Ali and Larimo, 2016) andMNE–host government level (e.g. Luo,
2001, 2004). As described here, the logic of theory “that no actor is self-sufficient, actors will
have to interface with each other to obtain needed complementary resources” has been
extended to the MNE–host government level. According to the SET, MNEs and host
governments need each other for critical complementary resources in today’sworld economy,
and sharing complementary resources cooperatively creates a payoff for both (Luo, 2001,
p. 402). Hence, the SET assumes a cooperative relationship between MNEs and host country
governments by underscoring the potential for mutual gain (Luo, 2001, 2004). The research
built on this assumption has proposed flexibility-cooperative mechanisms, such as the
alignment of an MNE’s objectives with the host government’s social and economic objectives
and developing trust-based informal networks with local businesses and people of the host
government to reduce political risk (Cavusgil et al., 2013). However, the TCT assumes a
conflictual–adversarial relationship between the foreignMNEs and the host government due
to their different objectives and self-interest with guile (Luo, 2001, p. 402). The former focuses
on wealth generation, while the latter focuses on social welfare (e.g. Luo, 2001, 2004). The
research built on this assumption has proposed for control mechanisms, such as the
formation of EJVs with a target country firm (Lopez-Duarte and Vidal-Suarez, 2010; Puck
et al., 2009). This assumption is built on the logic that the target country firm’s possession of
country-specific knowledge and overall sharing of resources and risk in an EJV should reduce
political risks. However, another group of TCT scholars argues that an EJV with a target
country firm can expose an MNE to particular risks associated with partners’ behavior
(Ahmed et al., 2002). Therefore, instead of EJV formation, MNEs should negotiate an arm’s
length classical contract or a CJV with a target country firm to manage the political risks
(Mullner, 2016). Differentiating from the international market entry literature, finance
literature suggests buying PRI as another control mechanism to reduce political risk (e.g.
Lessard, 1996; Voelker et al., 2008). Finally, the PM literature proposes that the choice of
appropriate payment method (i.e. the choice between fixed cost, cost plus fixed fee and target
price) in IPOs is an important control mechanism that mitigates the political risks.
Furthermore, conventional wisdom from the PM literature suggests that at high political risk,
cost plus fixed fee and target price are the best methods to manage these risks (Turner, 2001).
Thus, various strands of prior literature propose a range of mechanisms to reduce political
risk in IPOs ranging from different strategic options to payment methods. Given the complex
and multifaceted nature of political risks in EMs, we adopt the view that several mechanisms
are required to reduce them.We develop the following comprehensive conceptual framework
of political risk management based on the prior literature as well as the first phase of data
collection and analysis (Figure 1). After the second phase of data collection and analysis, this
framework has been further upgraded (Figure 4).
3. Research methodology
This study adopts an abduction-based qualitative research approach as we are taking an
exploratory stance and are interested in offering a richer understanding of the DMNEs’
perception and management of political risks when undertaking infrastructure projects in
EMs. An abduction-based qualitative research approach is particularly effective in opening
the “black box” to bring forth a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context,
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especially when limited guidance is available in the literature (Teagarden et al., 2018; Yin,
2003). In particular, simultaneous use of available literature and qualitative data from the
case company enabled us to understand better the neglected aspects of political risk
perception and its management by DMNEs, thus helping us draw new insights. We selected
six case projects of a single MNE that has decades of experience of IPOs in EMs. Each of the
case projects was a unique platform (e.g. Huemer, 2004; Owusu et al., 2007) and tool (e.g.
Dubois and Gadde, 2002) to investigate the real-world phenomenon ofmanaging political risk
in IPOs, from opportunity search stage till the project completion stage (e.g. Cova and
Holstius, 1993). Key informants helped us select the case projects, referred to as “key
informant sampling” by Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki (2011). However, following Yin (2003),
multi-criteria were used to select the case projects referred by the key informants. First, the
case projects had to be in EMs as our study focused on analyzing the perception and
management of political risks in EMs. Second, the case projects had to be completed so that
we should be able to explore the issues related to the political risk management mechanisms
that the MNE employed. Third, the case projects had to be in the energy sector so that
industry differences are constrained.
3.1 Data collection and analysis
This research seeks an abductive approach to data collection and analysis by systematically
combining the theory and empirical data from research cases (Dubois and Gadde, 2002).
Accordingly, we did not follow a linear approach wherein a literature review-based model
could lead to data collection and analysis. Rather, we adopted an inductive–deductive
approach of several updates to the model, which was eventually used for thematic data
analysis and the case findings presentation. In particular, we adopted a two-phased approach
of data collection and analysis (Table 2).
The first phase comprises the development of the research model and data collection
simultaneously, wherewe exchanged emails with key informants and later undertook face-to-
face meetings (Yin, 2003). The logic of doing project business, sources of political risks and
their used strategies for managing those risks in the project business context were learned
from the key informants. Meanwhile, researchers collected secondary data from the World
Wide Web about the case company and its project operations modes. Key informants also
facilitated face-to-face discussions with some of the case projects’ team members and helped
access some of the case project-specific information (secondary data) for this research






theory with the empirical world (Dubois and Gadde, 2002) and developing the preliminary
research framework (Figure 1).
The second phase of data collection and analysis constituted of 14 semi-structured
interviews of key experts identified during the first phase of data collection. Additionally,
their significant role in the decision-making related to the case projects and at the case
company’s management level was verified with the key informants. The interviewees were
contacted via emails with the reference of key informants. Before the interview, an interview
guide (protocol) was sent to each interviewee. Alongside, the researchers verified their
consent to participate in this research and guaranteed case data security and anonymity of
the interviewees and the case projects.
While conducting interviews, we used the earlier shared interview guide (protocol) and a
list of typical questions to structure our discussion around the research question. Each
respondent was asked about (1) the physical structure of the project in target EM and
whether the respondent experienced the project as a single step or comprising of different
steps/stages and what were those stages, (2) their experience about the importance of
political risks in IPOs in the target EM, (3) at what stage of the project, the political risks
were assessed andwhat political risk factors were observed in the target EM, (4) what stage
of the project, strategies/mechanisms were chosen to manage those political risks and (5)
what strategies/mechanisms their firm had employed for managing political risks and their
effectiveness in reducing political risks. Respondents were also asked about the criteria, if
any, their firm had used to measure the project performance and their level of satisfaction
with the project performance. For further clarification of their responses, some interviewees
also shared some of the project performance reports and key milestones of the case projects
(secondary data). An overview of interviewees’ positions, their involvement in project
stages, their experience in project operations and each interview’s duration and themedium
is presented in Table 3.
Based on the interviews, informal discussions and case project data, the case project briefs
were developed, similar to the narrative strategy (Richmond, 2002; Riessman, 2005). Herein,
the purpose was not to establish causality between the perception of political risks and the
management of political risks in IPOs but to explore the mechanisms which Energy Co.
deployed to manage the political risks. Therefore, instead of fracturing data into codes, the
researchers connected (Maxwell, 2013, p. 112) the case briefs with the literature identified
themes (i.e. political risk factors and the mechanisms of political risk mitigation). This was
done manually on paper for each of the cases by two researchers individually, and then the
Phases Data sources Category Timing
Phase 1 World Wide Web of the case company and
business performance reports
Secondary In parallel with the
literature search
Case company general guidelines on the business
ethics, strategy and future vision (limited access to
the material shareable with the externals)
Secondary In parallel with
literature search
Informal discussions with the case project team
members and the key informants (total eight
discussions)
Primary In parallel with the
literature search
Case project data (external stakeholder reports,
project performance reports and key milestone
dates, risk management plans and risk registers,
etc.)
Secondary In parallel with
literature search
Phase 2 Targeted interviews with semi-structured
approach








findings were cross-verified to draw final results. According to Langley (1999), contextual
details in narrative analysis offers sense-making of the hidden realities, which extant
research on political risk management has not employed so far.
3.2 Research context and embedded cases
This research investigates six energy infrastructure projects (EIPs) in EMs as embedded
cases (Yin, 2003) of anMNE fromNorth Europe. Multiple embedded cases from a singleMNE
context provided us a consistent boundary condition for interpreting the data and facilitated
the findings’ analytical generalization (Teagarden et al., 2018). The case company, here called
Energy Co., is an OEM that operates globally through its network offices in more than 60
countries. Major manufacturing facilities of the Energy Co. are in Europe and Asia. The
business focus of Energy Co. is on delivering EIPs in developed as well as in EMs. Energy Co.
has positioned itself as one of the key players in the energy market with its global
business focus.
Based on the guidance from S€oderlund and Tell’s (2009) study, Energy Co. can be
considered as a P-form enterprise whose focus is on the integration of technology-based
products and services from its various functional and manufacturing units (Melkonian and















þ20 years 1 h/face-to-face




þ20 years 1 h/face-to-face
Interview 3 Contract manager Project implementation þ15 years 1 h/face-to-face
Interview 4 Managing director,
network company
Market development,
opportunity search, bidding and
negotiation, and implementation
þ20 years 1.5 h/video
conferencing
Interview 5 Country contract
manager
Project implementation þ10 years 1.25 h/video
conferencing





10 years 1 h/face-to-face
Interview 7 Business director Market development, bidding
and negotiations
þ15 years 1 h/video
conferencing
Interview 8 Director, PM Project bidding and
negotiations, project
implementation
þ25 years 1 h/face-to-face
Interview 9 Program manager Project implementation þ25 years 1.75 h/face-to-
face





þ20 years 1.25 h/video
conferencing
Interview 11 Senior project
manager
Project implementation þ20 years 1 h/face-to-face




þ20 years 0.75 h/face-to-
face
Interview 13 Proposal manager Project biddings þ30 years 1.25 h/face-to-
face







projects comprising of large complex product systems (Kowalkowski et al., 2015). Several of
the infrastructure projects implemented by Energy Co. fulfill Kardes et al. (2013) criteria for a
megaproject. Meanwhile, Energy Co. has two dedicated business divisions, one for the
offshore infrastructure projects and one for the onshore infrastructure projects. All the six
cases investigated in this research are onshore EIPs in EMs. Detailed contextual
characteristics of these projects are outlined in Table 4.
3.2.1 Case A. In Case A, Energy Co. had a project agreement with the private-owned
enterprise (POE) in Bangladesh. Under the agreement, Energy Co. supplied the equipment of
EIP to the buyer. However, the buyer had a separate contract with a local company who
installed the EIP. In addition, the local office of Energy Co. supervised the installation of EIP
and tested EIP once it was completed (see (i) in Figure 2).
3.2.2 Case B. In Case B, a POE earned the contract from a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in
Indonesia to deliver a complete EIP. POE formed a CJV with Energy Co. for the delivery of
EIP. Under the CJV agreement, POC and Energy Co. built and transferred the complete EIP to
the SOE. In addition, the local office of Energy Co. supervised the installation of EIP and
tested once EIP was ready (see (ii) in Figure 2).
3.2.3 Case C. In Case C, Energy Co. supplied a complete EIP to the EJV formed between
SOE and POE in Brazil. Further, Energy Co.’s network office in Brazil supervised EIP’s
installation and tested EIP once it was ready. However, in this case, Energy Co. also engaged
the local sub-contractors fromBrazil for the installation and construction of the EIP (see (iii) in
Figure 2).
3.2.4 Case D. In Case D, Energy Co. had a project agreement with the POE in Jordan. Under
the agreement, Energy Co. supplied a complete EIP to the buyer. Further, Energy Co. also
engaged the local sub-contractors from Jordan to install and construct the EIP (see (iv) in
Figure 2).
3.2.5 Case E. In Case E, Energy Co. supplied a complete EIP to the EJV formed between
Energy Co. and POE in Pakistan. So, Energy Co. supplied and co-owned the EIP. Further,
Energy Co.’s network office in Pakistan supervised EIP’s installation and tested EIP once it
was ready. However, Energy Co. also engaged the local sub-contractors from Pakistan for the
installation and construction of the EIP (see (v) in Figure 2).
3.2.6 Case F. In Case F, Energy Co. formed a CJV with an SOE builder in Indonesia that
earned a contract from an SOE utility to deliver a complete EIP. Therefore, Energy Co. along
with the SOE builder together supplied the complete EIP to the SOE utility. Further, Energy
Co.’s network office in Indonesia supervised the installation of EIP and tested of EIP once it
was ready (see (vi) in Figure 2).
4. Study findings
Based on interview data from respondents, we have attempted in Figure 3 to provide an
overview of the reduction of political uncertainty and its transition to political risk during the
four stages of project development.
The graph (Figure 3) suggests that the political uncertainty is high during the initial stage
of “market development and opportunity search” and starts decreasing substantially at the
end of this stage as more information and knowledge about the political environment of
target EM become available, and therefore, political uncertainty is converted into political
risk. Therefore, at the commencement of the second stage of “project preparation and
development,” an MNE identifies the political risks and decides the mechanisms for
managing them.
Political risks in EMs are a reality, and our case company deployed several mechanisms to
mitigate those risks in the case projects to safeguard the promised return on investment


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Project delivery (equipment supply/partial project)
Project delivery (equipment supply/partial project)














































(i) Physical structure of project in case A
(ii) Physical structure of project in case B
(iii) Physical structure of project in case C























































(v) Physical structure project in case E
(vi) Physical structure project in case F
Project delivery (equipment supply/partial project)
Note(s): Energy infrastructure project (EIP); State owned enterprise (SOE); Contractual joint venture
(CJV); Equity joint venture (EJV) 
Market development 














































during the four stages
of project development
IMR
capabilities of identifying project risks, including political risks (Cova and Holstius, 1993).
Most of our interviewees stated: “Political risk is the biggest risk for project business when
you are in emerging markets,” and it was verified from the case project data (i.e. data from
case company’s risk registers and mitigation plans). Further, it was confirmed from
interviews that Energy Co. identifies the political risks and decides the mechanisms to reduce
them during the second stage of the project life cycle (Figure 3). Interviewees also confirmed
that “all the identified political risk factors in the literature review of this paper are relevant
for assessing [i.e. they are evaluated for identifying] political risks for the energy
infrastructure projects.” Table 5 lists the examples of political risk perceptions quoted
during the interviews. However, interviewees revealed that different countries have different
challenges, and what political risks are relevant depends on the “ground realities” and
“historical events.”
4.1 Political risk factors
Though Energy Co. evaluates all the political risk factors identified in this paper’s literature
review, the relevance of political risk factors in each EM depends on the ground realities of
that particular EM. Political risks in EMs that were of concern to most of the respondents, in
five of the six case projects in EMs, are corruption and bribes, political regime change, risk of
labor unions and protests, and social violence and strikes. Table 6 summarizes the key
political risks in EMs. This stresses that these political risks are pretty common in all EMs.
Further, political risks that were of concern to some respondents, in four of the six case
projects in EMs, are discriminatory taxation and change in tax regulations, restriction on the
number of expatriate employees, excessive demands and variations in a project from the host
government over time, terrorism at site location, weakly enforced laws and regulations, and
security problems and risk of a violent attack on project site. This stresses that these political
risks are salient concerning few EMs. Also, some political risks were of concern to few
respondents, in ≤ three of the six case projects in EMs, are delay in the approval of permits,
profit remittance and exchange restrictions, import restrictions, unstable government
policies impacting the project, enforced renegotiations of contract by the host government,
anti-project demonstrations by public, contract repudiation and an outbreak of inter-state
war. However, there was no concern of nationalism or confiscation in any of the case projects
in EMs. Overall, we conclude that some political risk factors are relevant in all EMs, some in
few EMs and one is not relevant in any of the investigated EMs.
4.2 Applied mitigation mechanisms
After identifying the political risks in EMs, mechanisms are employed to mitigate those
political risks. The mechanisms that many respondents favored to mitigate political risks, in
≥ four of the six case projects in EMs, are aligning objectives with the host government, fixed-
term payment method, developing trust-based informal networks with local business and
people of the host government, progressive payments and obtaining payment guarantee
from local or global financial and commercial institutes. Especially the last two mechanisms,
favored by Energy Co., are new findings, which prior literature on political risk management
have not addressed. Table 7 summarizes the employedmechanisms tomitigate political risks.
Further, in three of the six case projects, an arm’s length classical contract with a target
country firm was employed to reduce political risks. In addition, mechanisms that some
respondents favored to mitigate political risks, in two of the six case projects in EMs, are CJV
formation with a target country firm and seeking a higher project price to cover
contingencies. In addition, one of the six case projects, an EJV with a target country firm
and buying PRI were employed to mitigate political risks. Overall, we conclude that political
risk is subject to constraints from several mechanisms, where some mechanisms are
Political risk
management
Political risk factors Quotations
1 – Corruption and bribes (a) “We have to follow our code of conduct. . .and it can be a
reason that a project never materializes [for us]"; (b) “This was a
hot topic during project development and sales. . . project owner
did special training arrangements for us to understand this topic
[about the project country]”; (c) “We force our [local] partners to
comply to those rules [Energy Co.’s code of conduct]”; (d) “If our
competitors [in countries with this high risk] do not follow the
same [European] rules then we are out. . . there is saying that
‘kind kids care waiting and left without”; (e) “It was directly
negotiated project [an example] with an SOE. [due to some
compliance issues] it was decided that Energy Co. will not make
direct deal with SOE”
2 – Delay in approval of permits (a) “[In countrieswith high corruption]we do notwant to do this”;
(b) “They keep in asking you different documents so the
approvals etc. will be delayed”; (c) “You want your permit
approved but there is always an official way and there is also a
‘faster way’ to it. . .but for us there is one way to do it and that is
to do it by the book”
3 – Nationalism or confiscation (a) “It is important to consider [already during development
phase]”; (b) “There are some historical examples. . . in country
[name] it may not a problem anymore”
4 – Profit remittance and exchange
restrictions
(a) “If the country runs out of foreign exchange [reserves] so you
cannot take back you cash from the country. . .so you have to
have ways to mitigate this. You do this during project
development phase otherwise those will affect you later on”; (b)
“You need to take into account what are the national limitations
in transferring funds to our home country bank accounts for
example, I have heard that in [country name] they implemented
that you cannot transfer money outside the country and if you
manage to transfer then there are very high taxes”
5 – Import restrictions (a) “They want us to find local suppliers for non-critical items,
and if those materials are available locally then there are quality-
related challenges which need extra arrangements from our
side. . .They have a way to blacklist foreign countries if the local
content of certain % is not used”; (b) “They ask different things
[to include] in the [import documentation name]. . . an indirect
way to restrict”
6 – Discriminatory taxation/change in tax
regulations
(a) “Taxation is a big risk even having local office, we still need to
verify if they are entitled to do this as a local company”; (b)
“Country decides they have a problem of managing the fiscal
budget. So they raise taxes and your profit as investor decreases
and it can reduce your ROI, unless you mitigate this risk in
development phase"
7 – Political regime change (a) “It is difficult you have to trust that the agreement you signed
will [with]stand”; (b) “The newprojects should be up and running
in very short periods [less time is available for implementation],
and before the next elections”; (c) “Next year there are
elections. . .they [politicians] are busy with the energy industry
to make new plans, so getting new projects is difficult”; (d) “It is
political risk due to which many projects go on hold or
[otherwise] the project business slows down when the new







Political risk factors Quotations
8 – Restriction on the number of expats (a) “We had to make [employment] contracts of foreigners [with
our branch office] and then also had to hire locals too”
9 – Contract repudiation (a) “Usually the need for electric power is increasing [in emerging
markets]. So, we do not see this as a risk factor”; (b) “Hardly ever,
but there are delays in starting of the signed contract. It
happened once in my experience. . . customer was not able to
arrange equity in the agreed currency”
10 – Excessive demands and variations in
project from the host government over
time (contract violations)
(a) “They do understand that they have power... when it comes to
commercial part they have [country’s] annual budget they are
ties to. Sometimes depending on their budget figures, they start
to find errors in our invoice, such as the difference of few
decimals. They typically do not tell us immediately [as per the
contract]. . . and we never get what is official [way]"; (b) “If the
team are not knowledgeable then the bidder suffers because then
they [regulators] can ask make unnecessary requirements and
may try to use the space for situation which is not in compliance
with certain rules”; (c) “. . . Yes [in country] contract is helpful
when there is extreme conflict”; (d) “Letter of credit losses its
meaning, for example, when the invoice has to be approved the
customer in some countries like some of our customers are
government owned company. In that caseways for limitation are
very limited”
11 – Enforced renegotiations of contract
by the host government
(a) “[signed] contract is not important for them. . . you have to
have courage to sit with them to discuss again and again . . .”; (b)
“They renegotiate all the time. It is their way of working”
12 – Unstable government policies
impacting the project
(a) Government policy is a trigger for developing [energy
infrastructure] projects. . .“This develop trust or distrust....”; (b)
“But for the projects in sales pipeline, the political policies
uncertainty then the investment decisions are hold”; (c) “They
have track record for handling foreign investors: clear rules with
proven [implemented] projects”
13 – Unstable local transportation rules
and regulations
(a) “We outsource the whole transportation of our equipment to
an international firm. But they were not prepared because that
company was not understanding the local requirements”; (b)
“Every regional office had their own way of working. . . each
time you have different dimension to the communication. The
SOE stakeholders were not aligned and they were control freaks
and want to have you on knife edge”
14 – Terrorism at site location (a) “We did some studies and involved our security manager
[local office support] to make plan”; (b) “and also sometimes that
which part of the country you are doing project. For example, in
case project [name of project] . . .”
15-Risk of labor unions/labor protests (a) “We usually do it during project development phase and get
inputs from various [potential] sub-contractors”; (b) “Every year
[period name] there is a raise of salaries but due to [. . .] therewere
layoffs instead of wage raise. We can’t do anything but to plan
our project [works] accordingly. . .we also involved consortium
leader for this”
16 – Outbreak of inter-state war (a) “It is something you consider [already during project
development], but you do not spend much time on it”
17 – Social violence/strikes (a) “. . . Then everything stops. It is not easy to move. . .For
project [name]meeting, I was in [county name]when people come
out on rods for strike. I asked the customer to please come to my
hotel because I cannot move outside”
(continued ) Table 5.
Political risk
management
important response mechanisms to mitigate political risks in all EMs and some mechanisms
are employed for mitigating the political risks in some EMs.
4.3 Analytical framework for political risk mitigation in emerging markets
We draw two key conclusions about the applicability of political risk management
mechanisms. Firstly, some political risk factors are found relevant in all EMs, some in few
Political risk factors Quotations
18 –Weakly enforced laws and regulations (a) “It is a problem not impact on our business because energy
sector regulations are clear and enforced”; (b) “We always try to
use a neutral country for applicable law. We prefer that it is the
buyer country legislation is not applicable. We try to avoid the
need to go to the local court . . .”
19 –Anti-project demonstrations by public (a) “If you are developing a project, you leave it to a later stage.
[But] if the site is such a region then you have to consider how to
move people out [in such situations]”; (b) “The local community
started to though rocks and stopped us [to continue work].
Project work was suspended for seven days”
20 – Security problems/risk of violent
attack on project site
(a) “The firstmost important think come tomymind is the people
you are going to bring to that country”; (b) “We stay at
designated areas [in the city] and then the timing and schedules















1 – Corruption and bribes U U U U  U
2 – Delay in approval of permits U U U   
3 – Nationalism or confiscation      
4 – Profit remittance and exchange restrictions  U U U  
5 – Import restrictions   U U  U
6 – Discriminatory taxation/change in tax regulations U  U  U U
7 – Political regime change U U U  U U
8 – Restriction on the number of expatriate employees U  U U  U
9 – Contract repudiation U     
10 – Excessive demands and variations in project from
the host government over time (contract violations)
U U  U  U
11 – Enforced renegotiations of contract by the host
government
 U  U  
12 – Unstable government policies impacting the
project
 U U  U 
13 – Unstable local transportation rules and
regulations
 U U U U 
14 – Terrorism at site location U U  U U 
15 – Risk of labor unions/labor protests U U U U  U
16 – Outbreak of inter-state war     U 
17 – Social violence/strikes U U U U U 
18 – Weakly enforced laws and regulations  U U  U 
19 – Anti-project demonstrations by public U   U  
20 – Security problems/risk of violent attack on project
site
U U  U U 
Table 6.
Summary of the
political risks in EMs
IMR
EMs and the risk of “nationalism and confiscation” is not found relevant in any of the
investigated EMs. However, it is important to mention that Energy Co. evaluates the risk of
“nationalism and confiscation” during the second stage of “project preparation and
development.” Secondly, political risks are subject to constraints from several mechanisms,
where some mechanisms are used in all EMs to mitigate political risks, and some are used
only in a few EMs to mitigate the political risks. In the following, we propose the analytical
framework of political risk management based on the case findings, and we further discuss
the applied mechanisms with reference to the prior literature (Figure 4).
The study sought to explore themechanisms used by the EnergyCo. tomanage the political
risks in six case projects in five EMs. The proposed analytical framework (Figure 4), based on
the findings of the case projects of Energy Co., suggests that two mechanisms from the SET,
namely, aligning objectives with the host government and developing trust-based informal
networks with local business and people of the host government, are used to reduce political
risks. Further, political risks in EMs can also be reduced by three mechanisms from the TCT,
namely, EJV formationwith a target country firm, CJV formationwith a target country firmand
arm’s length classical contractwith a target country firm. Twomechanisms from finance-based













Aligning objectives with the host government – U U U U U
Developing trust-based informal networks with local
business and people of the host government
U U U U U U
EJV formation with a target country firm – – – – U –
CJV formation with a target country firm – U – – – U
Arm’s length classical contract with a target country
firm
U – U U – –
Buying PRI – – – – U –
Obtaining payment guarantee from local or global
financial and commercial institutes
U – – U U U
Seeking a higher project price to cover contingencies – – – – U U
Payment method – fixed term U U U U U U











(based on the findings
of the case projects)
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literature, namely, buying PRI and obtaining payment guarantee from local or global financial
and commercial institutes, also mitigate political risks in EMs. Finally, three mechanisms from
the PM literature, namely, fixed-term payment method, seeking a higher project price to cover
contingencies and progressive payments, also reduce political risks in EMs.
4.3.1 Aligning objectives with the host government. The use of this mechanism was
observed in five of the six case projects of Energy Co. to reduce the political risks in EMs. This
mechanism’s importance is obvious since the main agenda of the governments in EMs is to
develop the local infrastructure to sustain the higher economic growth rate and improve its
social performance (e.g. Luo, 2004). Therefore, if the DMNEs contribute to this agenda of
governments by delivering infrastructure projects, employing locals and embracing
corporate social responsibility, governments in EMs will cooperate with DMNEs, which
will reduce the political risks in the EMs. Reimann et al. (2012) further endorse this by
suggesting that host governments cooperate with MNEs who engage in the social and
economic development of the country, in particular, because it also helps the governments to
secure their own credibility with their respective stakeholders, such as voters. The following
quotes illustrate the importance of this mechanism:
(1) “It is getting more and more weight for financial institutes, and it is a critical issue for
owner side. If the project you are bidding does not contribute to the social and
economic growth of the country then what will happen to the project if country run
short of cash? And if your project is not on high priority then your project is going to
end up in a waiting queue.”
(2) “Themore important you project is for the prosperity of the country, themore priority
your project is going to get from the government as well.”
4.3.2 Developing trust-based informal networks with local business and people of the host
government. The importance of this mechanism in mitigating political risks in EMs was
observed in all case projects. Energy Co. opened local network offices in all EMs, except one
EM. These network offices in EMs hired local employees at different hierarchical positions,
which brought trust-based informal networks with local business and government
authorities. This is in line with the logic of the SET that signifies the importance of
developing trust-based relationships in business (Luo 2001, 2004). Cavusgil et al. (2013) also
argue that business in EMs is dependent on relationships, and having trust-based
relationships with people of the host government gain precedence in EMs. The following
example quotes illustrate the importance of this mechanism in reducing political risks:
(1) “It is very important to have branch office – the companies with branch office are
more successful than the competitors. Having a presence locally. Because it help
handling issues related to payments and handling the government authorities...”
(2) “A lot goes with personal relations which starts already from universities [i.e.
relationship of employees in local office]. The relationship continues as they are
always in a very’ tight community’. . . you can call it a kind of lobbing. So we already
start identifying risks during sales phase and we involve internal functions [local
office] and resources.”
(3) “The more unstable the more unreliable things are, it is most important to have
personal relations. Strong contract does not help you; the bigger the political risks are
the important is to build informal relationships.”
4.3.3 Formation of equity joint venture, contractual joint venture and classical contract with a
target country firm.AnEJVwith a target country firmwas used in one case project, and a CJV
with a target country firmwas used in two case projects to mitigate the political risks in EMs.
IMR
The importance of local partner in the form of an EJV and a CJV was important because local
partners brought the knowledge of the local political environment that helped Energy Co. to
reduce the political risks. This endorses the logic of the TCT to form EJVs and CJVs with
target country firms to mitigate the political risks (e.g. Lopez-Duarte and Vidal-Suarez, 2010;
Meschi, 2005). The following example quotes illustrate the importance of this mechanism in
reducing political risks:
(1) “They have track record for handling foreign investors: clear rules with proven
[implemented] projects. But in some countries, you cannot go alone in bidding,
without local partner on-board.”
(2) “We bring technical expertise and they bring local expertise to handle the political
risk factors. But in consortiums, it works when both consortium partners have same
objective.”
(3) “Getting some special permits. . .if you tell them the door in front of us is locked. Could
you please do something? Then only them by calling [to the concerned permit issuing
authority] the problem get resolved.”
However, it was observed that in three of the case projects, the political risks in EMs were
substantial, and therefore, Energy Co. used classical contracts with target country firms to
mitigate the political risks in EMs. This also endorses the logic of the TCT that when external
risks, including the political risks, are too high, and therefore, resulting risk of local partner’s
opportunism is high, then instead of forming a CJV or EJVs,MNEs should undertake classical
contracts with target country firms (Ahmed et al., 2002;Mullner, 2016) tomitigate the political
risks. The following quote illustrates the importance of this mechanism in reducing
political risks:
(1) “Contract is important – Contracts are important for Energy Co. and for our customer
we try to minimize the effect of political risks during contract negotiations. We also
split contracts in offshore and onshore to limit the impacts within the host company.”
4.3.4 Buying political risk insurance (PRI). PRI was used only in one case project to mitigate
the political risks in the EM. Finance literature suggests that PRI covers and compensates the
losses occurring to theMNEs investment due to the direct and indirect actions of government
(e.g. Lessard, 1996; Voelker et al., 2008; Zhang and Wei, 2012), and therefore, more the EM’s
political environment is risky, the more the DMNEs should seek PRI to mitigate. However, it
was noted that some respondents were not aware of PRI, and some, who were aware,
mentioned the higher costs associatedwith procuring PRI. The following quote illustrates the
importance of this mechanism in reducing political risks:
(1) “We have some sort of political risk insurance. In reality, it can be an insurance or
another policy you involve in a project. For example, we had political risk insurance
policy through a financial agency [name of institute]. The insurance become effective
at financial closing of the project, essentially at the implementation [phase of project].”
4.3.5 Obtaining payment guarantee from local or global financial and commercial institutes.
The importance of this mechanism in mitigating political risks in EMs was observed in four
case projects. However, while searching the theoretical roots of this construct, we noticed that
very limited literature (e.g. Mullner, 2016; Sawant, 2012) has discussed its role in mitigating
overall risks.We noted that Energy Co. networkedwith local or global reputable financial and
commercial institutes to secure payment for its projects and reduce the political risks in EMs.




(1) “If you look at different banks and financial institutes, they may have different risk
appetites in different countries. If you see [in their evaluation that] a country is having
red flags frommany institutes then it is red flag for the project itself. It means that the
project is not bankable and you have to ask that if banks are not going to invest then
why we should!”
(2) “One of the way we try to mitigate political risk is by [taking on] board, someone like
World Bank as partner [in the project]. They have special status in certain countries
that go beyond a single project. They have bilateral agreements with governments. If
there is a problem they [global financial and commercial institutes] will be the first one
to be paid. If you work with a partner like that then you take a lot of comfort. That is
definitely one of way of mitigation you need to consider.”
4.3.6 Payment method – fixed term. The importance of this mechanism in mitigating political
risks in EMs was observed in all case projects. The PM literature (Luostarinen and Welch,
1990, p. 139) lists three different methods of payment to the supplier: fixed price, cost plus
fixed fee and target price. The conventional wisdom from the PM literature suggests that at
high political risks, cost plus fixed fee and target price are the best methods to manage these
risks for project suppliers (e.g. Turner, 2001). However, Energy Co. instead used a fixed price
method that, according to the PM literature, suits to the buyer. All respondents stressed the
importance of using this mechanism because of several reasons: sever competition for
seeking EIPs, the role of contract to cover the cost of contingencies to support the fixed cost
payment and customer care. The following example quotes illustrate the importance of this
mechanism in reducing political risks:
(1) “[In Energy Infrastructure markets] the owners are dictating the construction
business with fixed price. . . they rotate the tender and lowest bidder wins and it
means fixed price. . .Also in emerging markets, the financing banks are putting roof
on the costs therefore fixed price is the preferred method.”
(2) “If project is delayed due to buyer. . .you need to have some kind of formula based on
which you can recalculate the price with help of contract. But we do not want to upset
our customers with this.”
4.3.7 Seeking a higher project price to cover contingencies.This mechanismwas used in two of
case projects to mitigate the political risks in EMs. Respondents stressed the importance of
this mechanism to secure required profit and to protect against costs due to the political risks.
But, respondents also reflected that Energy Co. does not increase price too high because it
lowers the probability of winning the bid. While referring back to the PM literature, Chang
et al.’s (2018) study confirms the importance of this mechanism in reducing the political risks
in EMs. The following example quotes illustrate the importance of this mechanism in
reducing political risks:
(1) “We have to have risk mitigation [costs] on top of the costs and margins.”
(2) “We needed more resources to help [local partner] in the project implementation. It
need to be taken in to account.”
4.3.8 Progressive payments.The importance of this mechanism in mitigating political risks in
EMs was observed in all case projects. The PM literature (Luostarinen and Welch, 1990)
differentiates between two payment methods: one-time payment and over time progressive
payment. Although existing literature has not studied these types of payment methods from
the perspective of political risk mitigation, this study’s findings illustrate that Energy Co.
utilized this mechanism in all its project in EMs to mitigate political risks. We assume that
DMNEs prefer establishing control over the situation while operating under political risk.
IMR
Progressive payments allow DMNEs to maintain the desired level of control. The
following example quotes illustrate the importance of this mechanism in reducing
political risks:
(1) “Payment terms stipulated in a contract is quite effectiveway tomitigate political risk
as well. For example, what kind of financial instruments the buyer is going to use. . .
[Upfront] advance payments are. If there is delay in the payment, then late payment
interests [should be applicable].”
(2) “Safeguarding the company, the payment method is the most important. If you are
paid upfront, the more the insecure situation is the more you have to ensure that
money is in the account.”
5. Discussion and implications
Although the trend of economic liberalization and demand for improved infrastructure in
EMs worldwide has presented new opportunities for DMNEs to undertake IPOs for
developing the infrastructure in EMs, there are also political risks in EMs. Prior research
suggests that political risk is the highest-ranked risk in IPOs, which, if not managed, causes
financial loss, schedule overruns and generally poor IPO performance (Chang et al., 2018;
Zhang and Wei, 2012). Despite the widespread agreement among researchers regarding the
importance of managing political risks (Dandage et al., 2018; Kardes et al., 2013; Mullner,
2016), little theoretical and empirical progress has been made toward exploring the nature of
political risks and the mechanisms that DMNEs use to manage the political risks while
undertaking IPOs in EMs. To fill this void, we adopt an abduction-based exploratory case
study approach and explore the perceived political risks and their management by a DMNE
when undertaking infrastructure projects in five EMs of Bangladesh, Indonesia, Brazil,
Jordan and Pakistan.
Our exploratory case study reveals that DMNE identifies the political risks and decides
the mechanisms to manage them at the commencement of the “project preparation and
development” stage of project development. Second, our study extends the literature on the
nature of political risks in EMs by revealing that some perceived political risks are common in
all EMs, but some others vary between EMs depending on the ground realities of the EMs.
This suggests that it is naı€ve to consider that perceived political risks in all EMs are the same.
Therefore, it is essential to unpack the political risks in each of the EMs from the perspective
of DMNEs. Third, the study extends the scope of current literature on the management of
political risks by revealing that political risks are subject to constraints from several
mechanisms, where DMNE uses some mechanisms in all EMs to mitigate political risks, but
the use of some other mechanisms depends on the nature of political risks in each EM. This
suggests that it is also naı€ve to consider that a DMNE uses the same mechanisms to mitigate
political risks in all EMs. Therefore, it is important to unpack the mechanisms that DMNEs
use to mitigate political risks in each of the EMs. In this section, we draw on the findings
from six case projects of the DMNE to discuss the stage of the project life cycle at which the
political risks are identified and how DMNE perceives and manages the political risk in EMs.
5.1 Political risk identification during the project life cycle
Prior research (Samset and Volden, 2016) has suggested that uncertainty is the highest at the
initial stage of the project and diminishes and converts into risk as the project progresses due
to information accumulation. Our study specifically demonstrates that the political
uncertainty is high during the initial stage of ‘market development and opportunity
search’ and starts decreasing substantially at the end of this stage as more information and
knowledge about the political environment of target EM becomes available, and therefore,
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political uncertainty is converted into political risk. Thus, political risk is identified at the
commencement of the second stage of “project preparation and development” (Figure 3).
5.2 Perceived political risk factors
While the existing literature implicitly assumes that political risk is universal, more recent
literature (e.g. Han et al., 2018) has challenged this conventional wisdom. Our findings
complement the research by Han et al. (2018) by revealing that the nature of political risks in
EMs perceived by a DMNE is not the same. We find that a DMNE evaluates all 20 political
risk factors identified in this paper’s literature review (Figure 1). However, only four of them
are present in all investigated EMs. These include corruption and bribes, political regime
change, risk of labor unions and protests, and social violence and strikes. These political risks
are of major concern in all investigated EMs, considering their devastating effects on the
project operations. The remaining 15 political risk factors vary between EMs depending on
the ground realities of the EMs, and one political risk factor (i.e. nationalism and confiscation)
is not present in any of the investigated EMs (see Table 6 for detailed results). However, the
respondents confirmed that nationalism and confiscation risk are evaluated before
undertaking IPOs in EMs. Combining these results, we conclude that the overall nature of
political risks varies between EMs though very few political risks are common in all EMs.
5.3 Mechanisms to mitigate the political risks in emerging markets
The findings of this research reveal that political risks are subject to constraints from several
mechanisms, where some mechanisms are commonly used in all EMs to mitigate political
risks, and some are used only in a few EMs to mitigate the political risks. Previous studies
present four different views to manage political risks. The SET logic (Cavusgil et al., 2013;
Luo, 2001, 2004) suggests the alignment of an MNE’s objectives with the host government’s
social and economic objectives and developing trust-based informal networks with local
businesses and people of the host government to reduce political risks. The TCT logic (Lopez-
Duarte and Vidal-Suarez, 2010;Mullner, 2016; Puck et al., 2009) suggests an appropriate entry
mode (i.e. choice between an arm’s length classical contract, CJV and EJV with a target
country firm) to manage the political risks. Finance scholars (e.g. Lessard, 1996; Voelker et al.,
2008) suggest for buying PRI to reduce political risk. Finally, the PM literature (e.g. Turner,
2001) proposes the choice of appropriate payment method (i.e. choice between fixed cost, cost
plus fixed fee and target price) in IPOs to reduce the political risks. However, given the
complex and multifaceted nature of political risks in EMs, we adopted the view that several
mechanisms are required to manage the political risks (Figure 1). Specifically, we find that
two mechanisms from the SET, namely, “aligning objectives with host government” and
“developing trust-based informal networks with local business and people of host
government,” one mechanism from the finance literature, namely, “obtaining payment
guarantee from local or global financial and commercial institutes,” and two mechanisms
from the PM literature, namely, “fixed-term payment method” and “progressive payments,”
are commonly used by DMNEs to mitigate the political risks in all EMs (Table 6). The
findings related to SET-proposed mechanisms are in alignment with the arguments of
Cavusgil et al. (2013) and Luo (2004) that if DMNEs deliver projects that contribute to the
economic and social well-off of the EMs, then governments of EMs will cooperate with
DMNEs, and hence, political risks will be reduced. They also argue that EMs are mainly
relationship-oriented, and therefore, developing trust-based social networks with local
businesses and the host government will reduce the political risks. Therefore, this research’s
findings encourage the DMNEs to make a greater effort to align their objectives with EMs’
governments’ objectives and develop trust-based informal networks to reduce the political
risks in EMs.
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Further, the importance of “obtaining payment guarantee from local or global financial
and commercial institutes” in reducing political risks is a new finding for IB literature. This
mechanism forces the EM governments to think twice before engaging in actions or events
that could harm the business of DMNEs. In the finance literature, Mullner (2016) and Sawant
(2012) highlighted its importance in reducing overall risks. Our study confirms the
importance of this mechanism in reducing the political risks in EMs. The findings related to
the importance of “fixed term payment method” and “progressive payments” in mitigating
political risks in EMs further extend the IB literature. Unlike the conventional wisdom from
the PM literature that recommends using cost plus fixed fee or target price when risk is high
(Turner, 2001), we find that fixed price is the preferred method by DMNEs to reduce political
risks in EMs. Using fixed price ensures the suppliers seek the project, and further, its nexus
with contract reduces the political risks in EMs. In addition, the importance of “progressive
payments” in reducing political risks in EMs is a new finding for the IB literature. Although
the PM literature (Luostarinen andWelch, 1990) differentiates between two types of payment
methods (i.e. one-time payment and overtime progressive payment), these payment methods
are not specifically linked to the political risk mitigation. We find that getting upfront
payment secures the DMNEs during insecure political situations.
We also find that the importance of the remaining five mechanisms varies between EMs
depending on the nature of political risks in each EM. Especially, we find very limited support
for TCT suggestion that DMNEs should form EJVs with target country firms when political
risk is high (Lopez-Duarte and Vidal-Suarez, 2010; Puck et al., 2009) because a local partner
helps to mitigate the political risk. Overall, it is found that when political risks are too high in
EMs, a DMNE prefers to use arms’ length contracts or CJVs with target country firms instead
of forming EJVs to mitigate the political risks. At the same time, existing finance literature
highlights PRI’s importance in mitigating political risks because it covers and compensates
the losses occurring to the DMNEs investment due to government’s direct and indirect
actions (e.g. Lessard, 1996; Voelker et al., 2008; Zhang andWei, 2012). However, we find that a
DMNE rarely uses this mechanism due to the higher cost of PRI. Finally, we also find that
DMNEs rarely seek higher project price to cover the contingencies due to this mechanism’s
higher cost. In addition, we develop an overarching and comprehensive analytical framework
of political risk management based on the findings of the case projects that combine several
strands of literature; SET and TCT from international market entry, PM literature and
finance literature (Figure 4). This framework encourages DMNEs to use several mechanisms,
amulti-strategy approach, tomanage the complex andmultifaceted nature of political risks in
EMs. This upgraded analytical framework is a way to go for future empirical research on
political risk management in EMs.
5.4 Practical implications
This research provides a number of practical implications. First, the presented holistic list of
perceived political risks in EMs can assist managers in DMNEs in their considerations and
choice of EMs to enter. Parsimonious identification of political risks is one of the most
significant steps in outlining effective political risk management mechanisms. Second, a
detailed illustration of thephases in thebusiness project life cycle and the types of political risk
that are likely to emerge in each phase serve as an assisting tool for the managers who make
resource allocation decisions during IPOs and estimate ROIs. Third, although establishing
high control over the business project in EMs has been the most preferred way to mitigate
political risks, this study points to the significance of negotiation with the local project
partners and building trust with them. Local partners not only assist DMNEs in political risk
reduction, they also help in establishing understanding about the customers’ preferences,
requirements of local institutions, nuances of political influence and more importantly,
gaining legitimate power from the local government. Still, such characteristics as reputation,
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capabilities and strength of political connectionwith the host country governments should be
carefully considered when choosing potential project partner in the EMs.
6. Conclusions, limitations and further research directions
This study investigates an under-developed yet fundamental question of how a DMNE
perceives and manages political risks when undertaking infrastructure projects in EMs.
Using an abduction-based qualitative research approach, we find that a DMNE identifies the
political risks and decides the mechanisms to manage them at the commencement of “project
preparation and development” stage of the project life cycle. We further find that some
political risk factors are common in all EMs, but the overall nature of political risks in EMs is
not same.We also find that political risks are subject to constraints from several mechanisms,
where DMNE uses some mechanisms in all EMs to manage the political risks, but the use of
some other mechanisms depend on the nature of political risks in each EM. Hence, our study
develops a complete picture of the nature of political risks in EMs and its management from
the DMNE’s perspective.
Like all academic studies, our study has some limitations as well. Firstly, the empirical
context is based on energy sector infrastructure IPOs undertaken by one Northern European
MNE in five EMs. Due to this sample limitation, we explicitly acknowledge that our study’s
findings cannot be generalized to firms operating in other sectors or industries in EMs.
Secondly, the study is also limited by the fact that case projects are only in five EMs. Future
research might investigate whether the results of our study hold in other EMs. Thirdly, a
limited number of case projects of the DMNE also raises questions on the study’s
generalizability even in a single sector of the energy business. We acknowledge these
limitations and therefore view our study as exploratory. Large-scale follow-up studies should
test the analytical framework developed in our study. Furthermore, we encourage
researchers to cluster the political risk factors and explore the relationship between risks
and specific mechanisms.
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